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Summary and policy recommendations
The demand for long-term care (LTC) is growing in most OECD countries (OECD, 2017). 
LTC can be provided by formal and informal caregivers, and striking the right balance 
between both types of care is a challenge. In this Netspar Survey Paper we first ana-
lyze from an economic perspective the trade-offs involved in this balancing act, by a 
review of the relevant economic literature. Next, we focus on one particular aspect of 
this trade-off: the negative health effects of providing informal care. We systemati-
cally review the growing number of empirical studies that aim to identify the causal 
effects of providing informal care on caregivers’ health.
 Insights from this paper may be especially relevant for the Netherlands, since 
its public long-term care expenditures are among the highest in the OECD and are 
expected to grow substantially in the coming decades (OECD, 2017; Eggink, Ras & 
Woittiez, 2017). Worries about the financial sustainability of LTC provision led to a 
radical reform of the LTC system in 2015. One of the aims of this reform is to encourage 
substitution of formal by informal care. For instance, by amendment of the Social 
Support Act (Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning or Wmo, 2015), citizens are no 
longer entitled to formal care from their municipality when their social network is 
capable of providing sufficient informal care. 
 Our review of the economic literature suggests that the individual decision to pro-
vide informal care is likely to depend on personal characteristics and the institutional 
context. Informal caregiving is likely to be concentrated among individuals with lower 
opportunity costs, or with fewer other activities competing for their time, such as 
people without a paid job. This implies that the burden of informal caregiving and 
the associated negative health effects are likely to be unequally distributed across the 
population. Based on insights from the Health Monitors of 2012 and 2016, we indeed 
note that in the Netherlands retirees and part-time workers more often provide infor-
mal care than full-time workers. 
 The potentially high and unpredictable costs for caregivers provide an argument 
for government intervention. Governments might relieve those who are likely to be 
most exposed to negative effects of the caregiving burden by subsidizing or organizing 
formal care. However, this could drive up public expenditures by crowding out too 
much of the informal care supply. To ensure that public money is spent effectively, 
governments could encourage appropriate self-selection of individuals, for instance 
by subsidizing the uptake of private LTC insurance and by setting the quality level of 
publicly available formal care. Deciding upon the optimal combination of instruments 
is difficult, however, as this depends on the prevailing social norms and altruistic 
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preferences in society. The stronger these norms and preferences are, the lower the 
risk that informal care is crowded out by public subsidies for LTC. 
 Based on our systematic review of the literature, we conclude that informal 
caregiving can have negative consequences for the health of the informal caregiver. 
Various studies show that informal caregiving can negatively affect the caregiver’s 
health. The stress and physical strain involved in caregiving tasks can lead to both 
mental and physical health problems. Informal caregiving is, for example, linked 
to symptoms of depression, increased drug intake, and an increase in self-reported 
pain. The strength of these effects varies between subgroups of informal caregivers. 
Several recent studies indicate that female, and married caregivers, and those pro-
viding intensive care may experience larger negative effects of caregiving. These are 
also the groups that provide informal care most often. These groups may experience a 
larger caregiving burden as they face other responsibilities on top of caregiving duties. 
Another explanation could, especially for women, be the pressure that is felt to 
provide care, making it more difficult to quit caregiving tasks when they become too 
burdensome (Pinquart & Sörensen, 2003).
 Future research should provide additional insights into these different subgroups 
of caregivers, specifically for the Dutch context. As this study shows, encouraging 
informal care may have important drawbacks. Our review thereby highlights the 
importance of accounting for the consequences of informal caregiving when making a 
trade-off between formal and informal care. Our findings furthermore emphasize the 
need for interventions aimed at reducing the negative impact of caregiving. Investing 
in support for informal caregivers by offering respite care or by organizing support 
groups could reduce the negative effects of informal caregiving. Policymakers should 
specifically target those subgroups of caregivers that carry the largest burden of infor-
mal caregiving.
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Samenvatting
Voordat je het weet sta je als burger zelf voor de keuze: ga ik wel of geen mantelzorg 
verlenen? Hoewel het een makkelijke keuze lijkt, is deze eenvoud bedrieglijk. Naast 
het verlenen van mantelzorg wordt van burgers namelijk ook verwacht dat zij langer 
doorwerken. Bovendien kampen vooral oudere mantelzorgers vaak zelf met gezond-
heidsproblemen, die mogelijk samenhangen met het verlenen van mantelzorg. 
Moeten we dan maar steeds meer zorg overlaten aan professionele zorgverleners? In 
dit survey paper staan twee vragen centraal. Ten eerste bespreken wij wat de econo-
mische theorie ons leert over de keuze tussen mantelzorg (informele zorg) en profes-
sionele (formele) zorg en de implicaties daarvan voor overheidsbeleid. Vervolgens 
zoomen wij in op één aspect van het verlenen van mantelzorg, namelijk in hoeverre 
dit gepaard gaat met negatieve gezondheidseffecten.
 In de economische literatuur bestaat veel aandacht voor de invloed van per-
soonskenmerken en institutionele omstandigheden op de keuze om mantelzorg 
te verlenen. Op grond van deze inzichten is het aannemelijk dat het verlenen van 
mantelzorg niet evenredig wordt verdeeld over de (volwassen) bevolking, maar vooral 
neerkomt op mensen met een lager inkomen of zonder betaald werk. Dit betekent dat 
een bepaalde groep burgers negatieve gezondheidseffecten van mantelzorg zou kun-
nen ondervinden. Hoewel overheidsingrijpen gewenst is om burgers te beschermen 
tegen deze onevenredig verdeelde en mogelijk hoge kosten van mantelzorg, kunnen 
interventies ook nadelige effecten hebben. De economische literatuur laat zien dat 
overheidsinterventies, zoals collectieve financiering van formele langdurige zorg, 
kunnen leiden tot suboptimale uitkomsten wanneer ze mantelzorg teveel verdringen. 
De rol van deze verdringingseffecten verandert echter wanneer de sociale normen of 
de altruïstische voorkeuren om informele zorg te verstrekken belangrijker zijn. 
 Voor de inschatting van het effect van overheidsinterventies om formele dan wel 
informele zorgverlening te bevorderen is meer inzicht in de gezondheidseffecten van 
mantelzorg noodzakelijk. Naar de causale gezondheidseffecten van mantelzorg is de 
afgelopen jaren in diverse landen onderzoek gedaan, maar een overzicht van deze 
bevindingen ontbreekt. Met dit survey paper beogen wij om in deze lacune te voor-
zien door middel van een systematische review van de literatuur van het beschikbare 
empirische onderzoek naar de gezondheidseffecten van mantelzorg. De opgenomen 
studies laten zien dat mantelzorg inderdaad tot negatieve effecten kan leiden, zowel 
op mentale als fysieke gezondheid. De aanwezigheid en grootte van deze effecten 
zijn echter niet gelijk voor de verschillende groepen mantelzorgers. Vooral vrouwelijke 
en getrouwde mantelzorgers, en personen die intensief mantelzorg verlenen ervaren 
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negatieve gezondheidseffecten van het verlenen van mantelzorg. Zorgelijk is dat deze 
groepen ook de groepen zijn die het vaakst mantelzorg verlenen. Een mogelijke ver-
klaring voor de grotere gezondheidseffecten is dat deze groepen mantelzorgers naast 
het verlenen van mantelzorg andere verantwoordelijkheden hebben. Ook zouden 
deze groepen, vooral vrouwen, zichzelf meer verplicht kunnen voelen om mantelzorg 
te verlenen, waardoor ze minder snel geneigd zijn te stoppen bij overbelasting. 
 Dit paper laat zien dat de keuze tussen formele en informele zorg complexe 
afwegingen vereist. In Nederland wordt steeds meer een beroep gedaan op de sociale 
omgeving, wat resulteert in een groeiend aantal mantelzorgers. Mantelzorg is echter 
niet gratis, want het onttrekt verzorgenden aan de arbeidsmarkt en kan gepaard 
gaan met een negatief effect op hun gezondheid. De negatieve effecten zullen 
afgewogen moeten worden tegen de kosten van formele zorg. Daarnaast kunnen de 
negatieve effecten van mantelzorg mogelijk worden gereduceerd door te investeren in 
mantelzorgondersteuning in de vorm van respijtzorg of steungroepen. Aangezien niet 
iedereen in dezelfde mate wordt geraakt door het verlenen van mantelzorg, zouden 
deze interventies mogelijk specifiek kunnen worden gericht op bepaalde groepen 
mantelzorgers. 
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1. Introduction
Many individuals face the decision whether to provide care for a spouse, family 
member, friend, or neighbor who needs help with running the household or personal 
care on a regular basis for a longer period. This help is defined as informal care and is 
typically unpaid. Alternatively, a formal, i.e. professional caregiver, may provide this 
long-term care (LTC). 
 In all developed countries, governments subsidize or organize some level of formal 
care. Aside from formal care, also informal care is often promoted by policy. Dutch 
policy, for example, stimulates citizens to seek help in their own social network before 
turning to government-funded formal care (WMO, 2015; CIZ, 2017). When informal care 
and formal care operate as substitutes (see e.g. Bolin, Lindgren & Lundborg, 2008; 
Bonsang, 2009), governments need to balance the costs and benefits of both alterna-
tives to achieve the appropriate mix of the two. 
 This paper aims to shed light on this LTC puzzle in two ways. First, we analyze the 
trade-offs that governments face when subsidizing or organizing formal care. We do 
this by providing an overview of the economic literature regarding these decisions 
and focusing on what these models mean for the role of government in LTC. 
 Second, we zoom in on one specific downside of informal care: the individual 
health effects of providing informal care. We focus on these effects because they 
are potentially major and irreversible – most caregivers are older and vulnerable 
Textbox 1: Financing of long-term care in the Netherlands
The Netherlands has a comprehensive public LTC financing system. This has a legal basis in the 
Long-Term Care Act (Wet langdurige zorg – Wlz), the Social Support Act (Wet maatschappelijke 
ondersteuning – Wmo) and the Healthcare Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet – Zvw). The 
types of LTC covered under these separate acts are respectively (1) institutional care and home 
health care; (2) social support, assistance, and housekeeping services; and (3) nursing and 
personal care (Non et al., 2015). 
Costs are kept in check through rationing measures that target both the supply and demand 
side (Bakx et al., 2015). On the supply side, the provision of LTC is rationed by imposing 
budgets, i.e. regional provider budgets (and regulated maximum prices) for LTC benefits 
covered by the Long-Term Care Act and block grants to municipalities for providing Social 
Support Act services. On the demand side, co-payments are required for care provided through 
these two Acts. Furthermore, access to care provided under the Long-Term Care Act can only be 
obtained via the independent care assessment agency (Centrum Indicatiestelling Zorg, CIZ). 
This agency assesses whether someone is eligible for formal care based on centrally set 
eligibility criteria (CIZ, 2017). Local authorities assess eligibility for care via the Social Support 
Act. In this eligibility assessment, the social context is taken into account. Hence, individuals 
are encouraged to rely on their social network before making use of formal care.
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Textbox 2: Informal care in the Netherlands and Europe
The share of caregivers has risen over the years. In some cases, informal caregivers may be paid 
from LTC insurance (through cash benefits). Informal care thus does not necessarily refer to 
unpaid caregivers but to caregivers outside formal employment contracts. According to data 
from the Dutch Health Monitors of 2012 and 2016 (N > 350,000 in both surveys), weighted to 
represent the Dutch population, the share of informal caregivers has grown from 19.3% to 
23.1% of the adult population. This represents an increase of almost 20% in four years in the 
total number of informal caregivers. Based on these numbers, we estimate that in 2016 more 
than 3 million individuals provided some form of informal care. Currently, more females than 
males provide informal care, although male participation is growing. In 2012, about 30% of 
the caregivers were male; by 2016, male participation had risen to 35%.
Both male and female caregivers provide around 9.5 hours of care a week on average. This 
average is higher for older caregivers (aged ≥65) as these provide about 14.5 hours of care a 
week. A similar trend is present when comparing the caregiving intensity between low-income 
and high-income quintiles. Individuals in the lowest income quintile provide twice as many 
hours of informal care compared to individuals in the highest quintile (12 hours compared to 6 
hours of care per week). A majority of Dutch caregivers have a paid job, and caregiving is 
furthermore concentrated among the older inhabitants. Most caregivers are aged 45-60, since 
of this group over 30% provided informal care in 2016. As to occupation, we note that 
homemakers, pensioners, and part-time employees more often provide informal care 
compared to full-time working employees (see table 1).
The share of the Dutch population that provides informal care is similar to that in neighboring 
countries. The Netherlands, and other Northern and Central European countries strongly differ, 
however, from the countries in Southern and Eastern Europe when it comes to the intensity of 
care provided. In the Netherlands, about 20% of caregivers provide intensive informal care 
(20+ hours per week), whereas this share is over 30% in the Czech Republic and about 50% in 
Spain (Colombo, Llena-Nozal, Mercier & Tjadens, 2011).
Table 1: Share of informal caregivers per subgroup 
2012 (% of total) 2016 (% of total)
Full 19+ population 19.3 23.1
By gender
Men 13.3 16.6
Women 22.6 25.7
By occupation
Homemaker 24.8 27.8
Part-time employee 23.1 26.4
Full-time employee 15.0 18.7
Pensioner 19.3 24.8
By age
19-40 years 11.6 13.0
40-65 years 26.0 30.3
65+ years 18.1 22.5
By income
Lowest income quintile 15.3 16.9
Highest income quintile 21.1 24.1
* Note that various 
confounding variables 
may underlie these 
descriptive statistics. 
Data weighted to 
represent Dutch 
population, results 
based on own 
calculations using 
Gezondheidsmonitor 
2012 and 2016
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themselves – and more difficult to compensate financially than, say, foregone labor 
market opportunities. In several countries the health effects of informal caregiving 
have been investigated empirically. However, a systematic overview of the results of 
these studies is lacking. To fill this gap, we provide a systematic review of the empir-
ical literature aimed at estimating the causal effects of informal care on health. We 
conclude this paper by summarizing the insights from both theoretical and empirical 
literature. Based on these insights, we formulate policy recommendations for the 
Dutch situation.
Textbox 3: The need for government intervention 
Expected LTC expenditures over the lifecycle are high – on average about 35,000 euros for men 
and 91,000 euros for women (Hussem et al., 2016) – and highly uncertain. Therefore, insurance 
against these costs is welfare-improving. However, private long-term care insurance covers no 
more than a few percent of all long-term care spending (OECD, 2017). Reasons for this low 
uptake include correlated risks, asymmetric information, consumer myopia, and a rational 
choice of parents who expect that the level of informal care provision will negatively depend 
on the level of long-term care insurance (see Boyer, De Donder, Fluet, Leroux & Michaud, 2017; 
Brown & Finkelstein, 2009; and Cremer, Pestieau, & Ponthiere, 2012 for more comprehensive 
overviews). 
This market failure to provide adequate coverage against the financial risks associated with LTC 
use is one of the reasons for government intervention in LTC financing. An important other 
reason is solidarity, as irrespective of market failures not everyone has the means to purchase 
insurance. Public LTC insurance, as opposed to subsidization and regulation, can overcome 
some of the problems that inhibit adequate private coverage. However, public insurance may 
be inefficient due to moral hazard, e.g. consumers using more – or more expensive – formal 
care or because potential informal caregivers underreport their ability to provide care (Barr, 
2010; Bakx et al., 2015).
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2. The trade-off between formal and informal care: an economic perspective 
Not everyone has a potential informal caregiver, and the costs of hiring a formal 
caregiver can be very high, placing a large financial burden on dependent individuals 
(Colombo et al., 2011). Furthermore, private LTC insurance that could protect individ-
uals against the high costs of care has limitations, leading to a low uptake (Brown & 
Finkelstein, 2009). For these reasons, governments often subsidize or even organize 
the provision of formal long-term care for at least the poorest part of the population. 
Indeed, in most OECD countries the majority of LTC costs is financed from public bud-
gets (OECD, 2010; European Commission, 2015).
 Informal and formal LTC are partly substitutes (e.g. Bolin et al., 2008; Bonsang, 
2009), and individuals may decide to use either of the two types of care.1 Economic 
literature provides some insight into what determines these decisions. We summarize 
this literature and discuss potential implications for the role of government in LTC.
2.1 The role of labor market productivity
A useful economic model to provide insight into a person’s decision to provide 
informal care is the Roy model about the self-selection of workers into different occu-
pations (Borjas, 1987; Heckman & Honoré, 1990; Heckman & Sedlacek, 1985). Nocera 
and Zweifel (1996) were the first to apply the Roy model to the decision to provide 
informal care. In this model, the caregiving decision lies with the caregiver, not with 
the person in need for care, and the potential caregiver maximizes expected utility. 
Utility can be derived from consumption, leisure, and potentially from caregiving. In 
maximizing utility, caregivers face a budget and time constraint. 
 Because of the trade-off between leisure, paid work, and caregiving, the oppor-
tunity costs of caregiving are foregone wages and leisure time. A person’s decision 
to provide care is based on his or her reservation wage for providing care. This is 
especially dependent on the wage that one could earn in the labor market. Other 
elements affecting this reservation wage are productivity, real wage, and preferences 
towards leisure and consumption. Productivity in this model refers to a person’s pro-
ductivity in caregiving and to the productivity in using consumption goods (relative to 
the price of these goods). 
 Nocera and Zweifel (1996) conclude that for all individuals the reservation wage for 
caregiving is positive. The height of this reservation wage, reflecting the willingness 
1 Throughout this paper, we make use of economic terminology and refer to the ‘decision’ to 
provide informal care instead of ‘determinants’ of providing informal care, which is more com-
mon in e.g. public health.
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to provide informal care, could, however, differ. As the reservation wage for care 
depends on the wage that someone can earn in the labor market, high earners will be 
less likely to provide informal care, for they would forego more income by providing 
care. Furthermore, highly productive caregivers, for example because they live closer 
to the care recipient, would be more inclined to provide care compared to less pro-
ductive caregivers. Lastly, individuals strongly valuing consumption will be less willing 
to cut back on working hours and are therefore less likely to provide informal care.
  Next to dedicating time to provide care themselves, individuals may help their 
dependent family member by hiring a formal caregiver. This might especially be the 
case for individuals who are employed full-time and for relatively high earners. This 
trade-off is considered explicitly by the Roy model used by De Zwart, Bakx & van 
Doorslaer (2017), where the decision is framed as a choice between informal caregiving 
and working but having to pay for formal care. The decision depends on the trade-off 
between wage and the cost of paying for formal care. This model shows that the 
individual decision to provide informal care might be driven not only by individual 
productivity, but also by contextual factors, namely the costs associated with formal 
care consumption. 
 This rather simplified model provides two important insights. First, it shows that 
informal caregiving – and hence the burden of caregiving – is not likely to be equally 
distributed across the population of potential caregivers: some people are more likely 
to take on caregiving tasks than others. Second, it shows that in case a government 
would have perfect information about which people will provide informal care, it may 
target formal care to people who do not have a potential caregiver in their network. 
 However, when the government has imperfect information, subsidizing formal care 
may result in moral hazard because people may pretend to be unwilling to provide 
informal care in order to receive governmental aid (Jousten, Lipszyc, Marchand & 
Pestieau, 2004). To reduce moral hazard, a government could take measures to 
encourage self-selection towards the type of LTC that is optimal from a societal per-
spective. This will be discussed in the following sections. 
2.2 The role of intra-family strategic behavior
A second set of economic models focuses on a specific type of potential caregivers and 
care recipients: adult children who may take care of their parents when these become 
dependent on help. In these models, caregivers are not viewed as the decision 
makers but as agents in a principal-agent setting in which they may be convinced 
to provide care to their principal – their parent – through the prospect of a bequest 
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(Zweifel & Struwe, 1996; Cremer & Roeder, 2017).2 These models consider a society 
consisting of two generations, parents and children, and two periods. Moreover, 
instead of a distinction between formal and informal LTC, they identify three potential 
sources of LTC: the family providing informal care, the market providing formal care 
via private insurance, and the state providing formal care via public insurance. These 
three options are assumed to be close or perfect substitutes.
 In these models, utility-maximizing parents derive utility from wealth. Parents 
face uncertainty about whether they will become dependent but know under which 
conditions to expect informal care from their children. Based on the potential help 
that parents expect from their children in case of illness, the parents decide in the 
first period whether to spend part of their wealth on private LTC insurance or to save 
it as a bequest to their children. These expenditures would yield a drop in utility at 
the cost of the insurance or the bequest. In the second period, parents may become 
dependent and need LTC, with insurance or informal care protecting them against 
LTC expenditures. The children decide their level of labor and informal care supply in 
period two, based on their wage and the expected bequest from their parent. 
 Cremer and Roeder (2017) show that the outcomes of this strategic game are sub-
optimal and hence imply that government intervention may be welfare-improving. 
The authors mention that without government interference, several inefficiencies 
may arise. First, parents might purchase insufficient insurance when the insurance 
premium involves significant loading costs or due to limited financial possibilities. 
Second, the labor supply may be inefficiently low because the level of the bequest 
depends on the amount of informal care a child is able to supply. Children who work 
more would have less time to provide informal care. Their parents in turn need to hire 
formal care, resulting in a lower bequest for the children. A caregiving-dependent 
bequest hence implies a tax on labor as additional labor earnings are partly ‘taxed 
away’ by a drop in the bequest. Third, the supply of informal care might be ineffi-
ciently low because children do not account for the possibility that parents value the 
help of their children more than care provided by a formal caregiver. Parents with 
limited ability to pay in this model are the ones in highest need of public aid. These 
parents experience a double burden as they cannot purchase insurance and are 
unable to induce their children to provide informal care via a bequest. 
 The authors discuss several interventions to overcome inefficiencies, all differing 
based on the informational context. A key element in these interventions is the need 
2 Knoef and Kooreman (2011) (among others) further extend these models by including siblings’ 
caregiving interactions, but this is beyond the scope of this review.
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for subsidization of informal care, as otherwise not enough care is provided. Most 
importantly, the models show that public aid does not necessarily crowd out informal 
care when children are non-altruistic. When children solely provide care because 
their bequest is dependent on doing so, they do not consider publicly provided LTC as 
an alternative when making their caregiving decision. In case parents do not have the 
resources to purchase insurance or to transfer part of their wealth to their children, 
publicly funded care might even enhance informal caregiving. When the state offers 
some level of public care, parents save money, which they can use as a bequest to 
induce their children to provide additional informal care. 
2.3 The role of altruism and social norms
While the previous sets of economic theories assume ‘selfish’ motives to providing 
informal care, the third set of theoretic models acknowledges that informal caregiving 
might be provided as a deed of altruism or due to social norms. Social norms, which 
make a person feel obliged to provide care, could be culturally determined (e.g. “it is 
one’s duty to care for a sick relative”) but can also differ based on caregiver charac-
teristics (e.g. “daughters and daughters-in-law have more caregiving tasks than sons 
and sons-in-law”). These social norms have been incorporated in some theoretical 
models. Barigozzi, Cremer and Roeder (2017), for example, assume that daughters feel 
a stronger obligation to provide care than sons and hence suffer disutility when they 
provide less informal care than the average child. Social norms may partly explain the 
observed gender differences in the supply of informal care. 
 Altruism, on the other hand, refers to the utility that children derive from helping 
their parents; this concept has thus far received more attention in literature than 
social norms. Pestieau and Sato (2008) assume that children are altruistic and willing 
to help their parents if needed.3 In their model, children derive utility from consump-
tion and providing help. The effect of help on utility depends on the amount of help 
provided and someone’s level of altruism. 
 The type of help – LTC provision or financial aid – given by children is based on 
their labor market productivity, as reflected in their labor income. Children with low 
market productivity lose less when they give up work to provide LTC by dedicating 
time to their parents. As a result, these children tend to provide a higher level of 
informal care. The amount of informal care that people are willing to provide drops 
when their labor productivity increases, down to a certain point where the amount 
3 We will focus on the 2008 paper as this one includes the market as a potential source of LTC, 
whereas the 2006 paper solely accounts for family and state provided care
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of care provided is minimal. From this point, children earn enough to provide LTC in 
the form of financial aid. From this point onwards, the level of monetary aid provided 
increases when productivity increases. If children are altruistic, the model predicts 
that the total amount of support will be U-shaped. 
 The model furthermore assumes that parents know how much help to expect 
from their children. Based on this knowledge, parents decide to purchase private 
insurance or to leave part of their wealth to their children. The model demonstrates 
that differences in the productivity of children may result in inequalities in the care 
received by their parents. Parents with low- and high-earning children can rely on 
help from their children. The remaining group has to purchase private insurance or to 
rely on governmental support. Government support is needed for the parents who do 
not receive enough help from their children and are unable to purchase private insur-
ance. The state could furthermore improve social welfare by subsidizing informal care 
when children are not fully altruistic. In such a situation, children do not completely 
account for the utility gain of their parents and provide less than the optimal value of 
help. 
 The authors examine various types of government interventions assuming imper-
fect information. They show that the optimal type of government intervention is a 
combination of measures that induce rich parents to purchase private insurance and 
that guarantee the public provision of care to poor parents. To achieve this, the state 
should encourage appropriate self-selection by setting the level of subsidy for the 
uptake of private insurance and the quality level of public nursing homes in such a 
way that rich parents will value private insurance over public nursing homes. 
 Cremer, Gahvari and Pestieau (2017) extend this analysis by assuming that different 
levels of altruism exist. This extension provides insight into the optimal amount and 
type of LTC insurance that should be supplied considering that the state cannot condi-
tion its support on the default of altruism (as this is unobservable and prone to moral 
hazard). The role of insurance (public and private) is studied assuming two forms of 
insurance supplied by the public sector: topping up and opting out. Either the state 
provides a lump-sum subsidy for formal care that persons can top up; or it provides 
LTC in kind, which elderly people decide to use or to opt out from. Which option 
leads to the optimal outcome depends on the altruism levels of the children in the 
population. If most children are highly altruistic, the opting-out scheme is preferable 
because highly altruistic children will let their parents opt out of this scheme and 
provide care themselves. After all, these children would provide more help than the 
state would and hence receive a higher utility from providing care themselves. In this 
situation, governmental aid is spent solely on those who need it, i.e. parents whose 
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children are not sufficiently altruistic to help. By contrast, a topping-up scheme is 
optimal when the altruism of most children is very low. As children with low levels 
of altruism would not provide enough care to be the sole caregivers, a topping-up 
scheme makes use of their limited supply of informal care instead of letting them 
opt out from informal care completely. In case children are moderately altruistic, the 
optimal level and type of public LTC is more difficult to define. Under an opting-out 
system, the level of public insurance coverage should then be small enough to con-
vince children to provide informal care, leading to a downward distorted supply of 
publicly provided care. 
 Both models show that altruistic children, in contrast to selfish children, take 
governmental interference into account when deciding upon the level of informal 
care to supply. In such situations, the level of publicly supplied care could crowd 
out as well as enforce informal care. Although the government is unable to observe 
altruism directly, it has the possibility to steer informal care decisions, for example via 
the quality of publicly provided nursing homes, the form of public LTC provision (lump 
sum or in-kind), and subsidies for the uptake of private LTC insurance. 
 
2.4 Societal trade-off between formal and informal care
The above-mentioned models demonstrate (i) how individual characteristics and the 
institutional context shape a person’s caregiving decision and (ii) that government 
needs to account for the response of caregivers when it intervenes in the financing 
and provision of LTC. As a variety of elements shape one’s decision to provide care, not 
everyone is equally likely to be a caregiver and therefore not equally likely to experi-
ence negative consequences. Combined with the fact that children often cannot fully 
insure themselves against the negative consequences of caregiving on the market, 
this provides an efficiency argument for government intervention, either by reducing 
the need to provide informal care or by compensating caregivers for the negative 
consequences of caregiving. 
 However, government may not be able to achieve the optimal allocation of formal 
and informal care because of imperfect information about a potential caregiver’s 
ability and willingness to provide informal care, and because of strategic behavior on 
the part of both caregivers and care recipients. Therefore, government policies that 
reduce the need to provide informal care (e.g. through public provision or private 
insurance subsidies) should encourage appropriate self-selection to ensure that 
public money is spent effectively. Potential instruments to achieve this (desirable) 
self-selection are (i) the quality of publicly provided care, (ii) in-kind provision of 
care (rather than a lump sum cash benefit), (iii) subsidization of insurance, and (iv) 
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taxation of labor earnings and bequests. However, the three sets of models we have 
discussed show that the optimal combination of instruments to achieve this self-se-
lection depends on assumptions regarding social norms and the level of altruism of 
children – two aspects that are notoriously hard to measure.
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3. Health-related consequences of providing informal care
Our review of the economic literature highlights the complexity of the trade-off 
between formal and informal care. One important element in this trade-off are the 
costs of informal caregiving, including the potentially negative health effects on the 
informal caregiver. A number of recent empirical studies have attempted to identify 
the causal effect of informal caregiving on health, but a synthesis of these findings 
is lacking. To fill this gap, we have conducted a systematic review of the studies that 
estimate the health effects of informal caregiving. 
 We focus on the health effects of informal caregiving for three reasons. First, 
the effects are potentially major and irreversible, especially considering that most 
caregivers are older and vulnerable themselves. Second, health effects are a risk for 
all caregivers whereas labor market effects can only occur for working-age caregivers. 
Lastly, it is more difficult to financially compensate health effects than other effects 
such as foregone labor market opportunities.
 Several studies have attempted to estimate the negative health impact of informal 
caregiving. Early systematic literature reviews and meta-analyses regarding the topic 
often find evidence of a negative effect of informal care (e.g. Vitaliano, Scanlan & 
Zhang, 2003; Pinquart & Sörensen, 2003; Pinquart & Sörensen, 2007). None of these 
studies specifically account for the possibility that certain groups of individuals select 
into caregiving. Yet, as described in the previous section, children with lower health 
expectations or a lower propensity to work are potentially more inclined to take up 
the caregiver role for their parents (Schulz, Visintainer & Williamson, 1990). The health 
states of caregivers and non-caregivers therefore already differ before commencing 
caregiving tasks. One should account for this endogeneity in the caregiving decision 
when estimating the causal effect of informal care on health. 
 There are various methods to identify causal effects, with the conceptually sim-
plest method being a randomized control trial (RCT). In RCTs, individuals are randomly 
assigned to either a control group or a treatment group, which makes comparisons 
between both groups possible. However, such random assignment is infeasible 
for informal caregiving, as we cannot randomly assign individuals to a caregiving 
task. In the absence of RCTs, quasi-experimental methods can be used to uncover a 
causal relation. Here, the selection into the treatment and control groups is carefully 
modelled. 
 Several studies have over the years used such quasi-experimental methods to 
overcome the selection problem related to informal caregiving. We are the first to 
systematically review this relatively new strand of literature. In order to provide an 
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objective, transparent, and replicable overview of the literature we have carried out 
this review systematically following PRISMA guidelines (Moher et al., 2009). We sought 
to address the following question: What impact does providing informal care to 
elderly or older family members have on the health of the caregiver?
3.1 Review methodology
Eligibility criteria
We included studies based on the following eligibility criteria:
1. The article focuses on informal caregiving to elderly or older family members.
2. The article estimates the health impact of informal caregiving on the caregiver.
3. The article is aimed at finding a causal relation between informal caregiving and 
caregiver health using any one of the following quasi-experimental methods: pro-
pensity score matching, simultaneous-equation models (instrumental variables), 
regression discontinuity designs, difference-in-difference models, or Heckman 
selection models.
4. The article is written in English.
5. The article is not a conference abstract, letter, note, or editorial.
Our specific focus on informal care to adults/elderly is in light of the fact that various 
definitions of informal caregiving exist. For example, many authors refer to looking 
after (healthy) children as providing informal care. Our definition of informal care 
solely includes providing care to a person in need, and is in this case limited to care 
to elderly or older family members. 
 To limit our search to studies making causal estimations, we searched for papers 
using econometric techniques that enable causal estimations in the absence of RCTs. 
We limited our search to five quasi-experimental methods, following the overview of 
Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart and Lalive (2014). 
Search strategy and data sources 
For all criteria, we defined keywords as well as Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) 
and Embase Subject Headings (Emtree terms). We searched the following databases 
covering social sciences as well as bio-medical literature: MEDLINE, Embase, Web of 
Science, and Scopus.4 An overview of the search strategy, which was set up with the 
4 We did not search the CENTRAL database, which covers studies using RCTs, as our research ques-
tion cannot be answered by studies using this research design.
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help of an information specialist, can be found in Appendix 1. All search results were 
stored in RefWorks, our main platform for keeping track of the literature review. We 
did not register a systematic review protocol.
 We furthermore used Google Scholar to identify any additional papers. This search 
engine could help in retrieving papers that (i) have not been published yet, or (ii) 
missed relevant search terms in their title and abstract. For this manual search, we 
used a search strategy similar to the search string used for the other databases. We 
hand-searched the first 150 Google Scholar hits. When articles were deemed eligible 
for review, they were added to the list of full-text review articles. All searches were 
carried out in August 2017. 
Review procedure
Three reviewers screened the titles and abstracts of all articles based on predefined 
eligibility criteria. Before commencing the review, the criteria were discussed to guar-
antee shared understanding. The researchers screened the articles (two researchers 
per article) based on title and abstract. To avoid bias, authors and journal names 
were not visible during this screening stage. If the article adhered to all inclusion 
criteria, it was then selected for full-text review. In this second stage, all included 
articles were reviewed full-text by two researchers, based on the inclusion and 
exclusion restrictions. As the specificity of eligibility decisions differed per stage, eligi-
bility criteria were again discussed before commencing the full-text review. For both 
stages, differences in screening results were discussed and resolved by dialogue, and 
if needed the third researcher would act as judge. An overview of the inclusion and 
exclusion restrictions per stage can be found in Appendix 2.
Data abstraction 
Data were extracted from the included articles using a predefined extraction table. 
The following items were recorded from each article: the author(s) and year of publi-
cation; country/region of interest; care recipient; definition of informal care; sample 
characteristics of the caregivers; health outcome measure; estimation technique; 
and main findings of the study. As we do not aim to provide a meta-analysis of the 
results, the main study findings were recorded qualitatively based on presence and 
direction, not on effect size. The results were synthesized in a narrative review. 
Quality assessment
To assess the methodological quality of the included studies, methodological infor-
mation from the papers was extracted using a predefined extraction form designed to 
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fit the methodologies used in the included articles. This form summarized the most 
important methodological elements of the papers. We did not calculate quality scores 
for the studies, but instead explained the methodological differences between the 
studies in narrative terms. For the studies using matching approaches, we indicated 
the extensiveness of the matching approach based on the suggestions by Lechner 
(2009). 
3.2 Results
Search results 
Our searches yielded 1,257 articles in total. After eliminating duplicates, our search 
findings totaled 621 articles. The hand-search resulted in five additional articles. From 
the 626 articles, 575 were excluded for a variety of reasons. Often the studies did not 
focus on informal caregiving but on another type of care. Furthermore, various studies 
were excluded as they did not estimate the impact of caregiving, but reviewed the 
efficacy of a specific intervention to improve the health of caregivers. Eventually 51 
Figure 1: Flowchart of screening phases
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Table 2: Characteristics and results of the included studies. Abbreviations: PSM: propensity score 
matching; 2SLS: two-stage least square; D-in-D: difference-in-difference; IV: instrumental 
variable; MCS & PCS: Mental Component Scale and Physical Component Scale
Authors Country
/Region of 
interest
Care 
recipient
Definition of informal 
care
Sample 
 characteristics
of caregivers
Health measure Methods Lechner 
(2009) 
matching 
procedure 
used
Results (if applicable,  
subgroup for which effect is found)
Brenna and 
Di Novi 
(2016)
Europe Parent Providing assistance to a 
parent, step-parent, or 
parent-in-law at least on 
a weekly basis
Distinction: Intensive 
informal care (excludes 
caregivers helping with 
domestic chores)
Women aged 
50-75
Depression (Euro-D) PSM Yes ↑ Euro-D (Southern Europeans)
larger effect when providing intensive 
informal care
Coe and 
Van Hout-
ven (2009)
US Parent Spent at least 100 hours 
since previous wave/in 
the last 2 years on help-
ing parents/mother/
father
with basic personal 
activities like dressing, 
eating, and bathing
Men and women 
aged 50 - 64, 
with only a 
mother alive
Mental health 
(CES-D 8); physical 
health (self-as-
sessed health (SAH), 
diagnosed heart 
condition and 
blood pressure).
Simultane-
ous-equa-
tion models 
(2SLS, Arella-
no-Bond)
N/A Continued caregiving:
↑ CES-D 8 (married males and 
females)
↑ Heart condition (single males)
↓ SAH (married females)
↑ SAH (married males)
Effects after 2 years:
↑ CES-D 8 (married females)
↑ Heart condition (single males)
Initial caregiving:
↑ CESD-8 (married females)
Di Novi, 
Jacobs and 
Migheli 
(2015)
Europe Parent Women providing care to 
elderly parents living in 
or outside the household 
in the past twelve 
months almost weekly or 
almost daily
Women aged 
50-65 having a 
parent with bad 
or very bad 
health 
Self-assessed 
health; quality of 
life (CASP-12) 
PSM Yes ↑ SAH (North and Continental 
 European caregivers) 
↓ CASP (Continental European care-
givers) 
↑ self-realized and pleasure in life 
(caregivers in Continental and 
Mediterranean Europe) 
↓ able to control life and autonomous 
(caregivers from Continental 
Europe)
Do, Norton, 
Stearns and 
Van Hout-
ven (2015)
South- 
Korea
Parent 
(in-law)
Any informal care pro-
vided to parents-in-law
Women with liv-
ing parent 
(in-law) aged 
45+
Pain affecting daily 
activities; fair or 
poor self-rated 
health; 
any outpatient care 
use; OOP spending 
for outpatient care; 
any prescription 
drug use; OOP 
spending prescrip-
tion drug
Simultane-
ous-equa-
tion models
(2SLS, 
IV-probit)
N/A ↑ Pain affecting daily activities, 
health self-rated as poor, OOP 
 outpatient care (daughters & 
daughters-in-law)
↑ Any outpatient care use, any 
 prescription drug use (daughters)
Fukahori, 
Sakai and 
Sato (2015)
Japan Family 
member 
living in 
the same 
house-
hold
A family member in the 
same household who is 
in need of care 
Males and their 
spouses aged 
50-64 
Employment rate, 
working hours, 
self-reported 
health, satisfaction 
with leisure time 
and life
PSM No ↓ Likelihood of participating in work
No impact on SAH or life satisfaction 
(results not presented in paper, men-
tioned in text)
Goren, 
Montgom-
ery, Kah-
le-Wroble-
ski, 
Nakamura 
and Ueda 
(2016)
Japan Adult rel-
atives 
with Alz-
heimer’s 
disease or 
dementia
Persons currently
caring for an adult rela-
tive, with Alzheimer’s 
disease
or dementia
Men and women 
aged 18+
Comorbidities; 
depression (PHQ-9); 
work productivity 
(WPAI); SF-36 PCS 
and MCS; healthcare 
resource utilization
PSM No ↑ PHQ-9, MDD
↓ SF-36 PCS, MCS and health utilities
↑ Depression, insomnia, anxiety and 
pain
↑ Absenteeism, overall work impair-
ment and activity impairment
↑ Emergency room and traditional 
provider visits in the past six 
months
Heger 
(2016)
Europe Parent Any caregiving activities 
to parent (help with per-
sonal care and practical 
household help provided 
outside or inside the 
household).
Distinction: daily, weekly 
and any frequency of 
caregiving.
Men and women 
aged 50-70
Depression 
(EURO-D); indicator 
whether someone 
suffers from ≥4 
depressive symp-
toms.
Simultane-
ous-equa-
tion models
N/A ↑ Euro-D, 4+ depressive symptoms 
(females)
larger effect when more intensive 
informal care
Hernandez 
and Bigatti 
(2010)
US Individ-
ual with 
Alzhei-
mer’s 
disease or 
a physical
disability
Caring for an individual 
with Alzheimer’s disease 
or a physical disability 
within the past year
Hispanic Ameri-
cans aged 65+ 
Depression (CES-D 
20)
Direct 
matching
No ↑ CES-D 20
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articles were selected for full-text review. From these 51 articles, 36 were excluded in 
the full-text review round. The most prominent reason for exclusion at this stage was 
the methodology used, i.e. the aim of the study to identify a causal effect. Eventually, 
15 articles were included in this systematic literature review. Figure 1 depicts the 
flowchart of screening phases.
 All articles were published recently, the oldest dating from 2009, the latest 
accepted but waiting for publication at the time of the search. The articles were 
published in a variety of journals, mostly relating to health economics or gerontology. 
The articles cover various countries of interest, using European data (n=6); Asian data 
(n=4); US data (n=4), or Australian data (n=1). An extensive overview of all articles is 
given in Table 1.
Authors Country
/Region of 
interest
Care 
recipient
Definition of informal 
care
Sample 
 characteristics
of caregivers
Health measure Methods Lechner 
(2009) 
matching 
procedure 
used
Results (if applicable,  
subgroup for which effect is found)
Hong, Han, 
Reistetter, 
and Simp-
son (2016)
South- 
Korea
Spouse 
with 
dementia
Persons living with a 
spouse with dementia
Men and women 
aged 19+ 
Physician-diag-
nosed stroke
PSM No ↑ Odds of stroke
Kenny, King 
and Hall 
(2014)
Australia Spouse, 
adult rel-
ative, 
elderly 
parent (in 
law)
Any time spent caring for 
a disabled spouse, adult 
relative or elderly parent/
parent-in-law in a typi-
cal week. 
Distinction
Care burden:
Low (less than 5 h/w), 
moderate (5–19 h/w) and 
high (20 or more h/w)
16+ males and 
females
SF-36 PCS and MCS PSM Yes After 2 years
↑ PCS (high care)
Effects for subgroups:
↓ PCS (high caregiving females with 
a job)
↓ MCS (high caregiving females with 
a job)
↑ MCS (high caregiving males without 
job)
After 4 years
↓ PCS (low and moderate care)
↓ MCS (moderate and high care)
Rosso et al. 
(2015)
US Family 
member 
or friend
Currently helping ≥1 sick, 
limited, or frail family 
member, or friend on a 
regular basis?
Distinction
Low frequency ≤ 2 times 
per week; high frequency 
≥3 times per week.
Women,
65–80 years old
Walking speed, grip 
strength, chair 
stands
PSM No After 6 years: 
↑ grip strength (low-frequency 
 caregivers)
Schmitz 
and West-
phal (2015)
Germany Unknown Providing ≥2 hours per 
day on care and support 
for persons in need of 
care on a typical weekday
Women aged 18+ SF-12v2 MCS & PCS PSM Yes Short term:
↓ MCS
Longer term:
No effects
Stroka 
(2014)
Germany Anyone in 
need
Self-reported informal 
caregiving to sickness 
fund to receive allowance
Distinction:
Level of care needed
Males and 
females aged 
35+ 
Drug intake PSM + 
D-in-D 
Yes ↑ Intake of antidepressants, 
 tranquilizers, analgesics and 
 gastrointestinal agents
Larger effect when more intensive care
Trivedi et 
al. (2014)
US Family 
member 
or friend
Any care provision in the 
past month to a friend or 
family member who has 
a health problem, long-
term illness, or disability. 
Non-institution-
alized
U.S. civilian pop-
ulation aged ≥18 
years 
Self-assessed men-
tal health; general 
health; perceived 
social and emo-
tional support; 
sleep hygiene
PSM No ↑ Report >15 days of poor mental 
health & inadequate emotional 
support;
↓ Report fair or poor health (females)
↑ Report fair or poor health (males)
↓ Receive recommended amount of 
sleep 
↑ Fall asleep unintentionally during 
the day
De Zwart
et al. (2017)
Europe Partner Daily or almost daily 
caregiving activities (help 
with personal care) to 
partner for ≥3 months in 
the past 12 months.
Males and 
females aged 
50+ 
Prescription drugs 
usage; the number 
of doctor visits in 
the past 12 months; 
EURO-D depression 
scale; self-per-
ceived health
PSM Yes Short term:
↑ Euro-D, ↓ self-reported health; ↑ 
prescription drug use(females), ↑ 
doctor visits (females)
Longer-term:
No effect
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Methodological quality of included studies
The fifteen included studies differ in their methodology and in the quality of the 
methods chosen. The table in Appendix 3 presents an extensive overview of the 
methods per study. We will discuss the most important elements regarding method-
ological quality in this section.
 Three of the fifteen studies use simultaneous-equation models to overcome 
the endogeneity of caregiving. The instrumental variables used in these studies are 
roughly similar, including indicators of either the health of the parent (Do et al., 2015) 
or widowhood of the parent (Heger, 2016; Coe & Van Houtven 2009). The F-statistics 
showing the strength of the instruments used are included in the table in Appendix 
3. They show to be of sufficient strength for all but one subgroup analysis according to 
Staiger and Stock’s (1997) rule of thumb.
 Most articles (n=12) use a matching design in order to compare caregivers and 
non-caregivers. As mentioned in our inclusion/exclusion criteria, we only included 
studies that matched respondents on health of the caregiver in order to avoid self-se-
lection bias. However, the quality of the matching strategy differs per study and is 
dependent on the likelihood that the assumptions underlying the matching approach 
hold (see Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) for an overview of these assumptions). We assess 
the strength of the matching strategies of the studies by applying the approach of 
Lechner (2009). This approach is aimed at improving the likelihood that the assump-
tions hold: his approach suggests matching individuals on pre-treatment covariates 
instead of current covariates and stratifying the sample according to the care provision 
in the previous year. The latter suggestion means that individuals who recently started 
caregiving (and did not do so last year) are only compared to individuals who did not 
provide care last year either. Doing so, potential influence of the treatment status on 
the covariates is avoided and pre-treatment differences in health are controlled for. 
Six of the twelve matching studies follow this approach and match on pre-treatment 
covariates and treatment status. We view the results of these studies as most reliable; 
these studies are marked as such in Table 1.
 Lastly, we evaluated whether the included studies accounted for the so-called 
family effect. This effect refers to the impact of caring about an ill family member 
instead of the impact of caring for a family member (Amirkhanyan & Wolf, 2006; 
Bobinac, van Exel, Rutten & Brouwer, 2010). Do et al. (2015) and Heger (2016) specif-
ically accounted for this family effect. Do et al. (2015) aimed to avoid picking up the 
family effect by focusing on (i) physical health effects and (ii) females who provide 
care to their parents-in-law. Heger (2016) aimed to disentangle the family effect from 
the caregiving effect by including separate variables to estimate the family effect and 
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the caregiving effect in the model. None of the other studies accounted for this effect, 
thereby potentially overestimating the effect of caregiving on health since the impact 
of caring for and the impact of caring about were not disentangled.
Comparability of studies
The different methodologies employed in the studies make it difficult to compare 
the effect sizes found. With a matching design, caregivers were matched to similar 
individuals who do not provide care. These studies hence estimated the health 
impact of informal care for the current informal caregivers. This effect is referred to as 
the Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET). When using instrumental variables in 
simultaneous-equation models, the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) is estimated. 
This represents the health impact of caregiving for those who started caregiving in 
response to the instrument, i.e. illness or loss of a parent. There are three potential 
methodological reasons for any observed differences in effect size between these two 
methods. First, effect sizes could differ as the ATET measures the impact of any form 
of caregiving while the LATE measures the impact of caregiving in response to severe 
illness or decease. Second, the instrumental variables used might be weak, thereby 
leading to bias in the effect size. Third, there might not be accounted for the family 
effect, leading to different estimates.
 The various definitions of informal caregiving and the variety of outcome measures 
further complicate a solid comparison of the findings of these studies. The definition 
of informal caregiving differs per study from providing care to a parent (n=5) or 
spouse (n=1), caring for anyone / a family member or friend (n=5), and informal care 
for someone with a specific illness (e.g. dementia) (n=2). Lastly, two studies proxy 
for informal caregiving by defining caregivers as persons living together with a family 
member or spouse in need. The studies also differ in their specification of caregiving, 
for example by restricting the sample to respondents who provide more than two 
hours of informal care per day. 
 In addition, various health measures were used to estimate the impact on health. 
Studies focus on the mental health impact (n=3), the physical health impact (n=4), or 
both (n=8). These health states are measured via either validated health measures, 
drug prescription data, or information on health care usage. 
Synthesis of results
In spite of the differences in methodology and data, we can derive some important 
insights from the studies because they provide a fairly coherent picture. All but one 
of the fifteen studies found a short-term negative effect of informal care on health 
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for subgroups of caregivers. Only the study by Fukahori et al. (2015) did not find any 
impact of informal care on health. A reason for this could be the very rough proxy 
of informal care used in this study: household members were assumed to provide 
informal care when someone in the household needs care. 
 While all but one of the studies found a negative effect, the magnitude of the 
estimated effects differed substantially. For instance, the negative impact of informal 
care on mental health differed strongly per subgroup of caregivers. Nevertheless, 
most studies found negative health effects for female, married, or working caregivers. 
Estimates of the physical health impact of informal care were less stable and even 
differed in sign. While most studies found negative physical health effects, some 
studies found positive effects of informal caregiving on physical health. How physical 
health is measured appears to be crucial: when measured by self-assessed health, the 
short-run impact of caregiving is positive, whereas negative health effects are found 
when outcomes are measured by intake of drugs and reported pain. Di Novi et al. 
(2015) claimed that the positive impact of informal care on self-assessed health could 
be the result of a bias related to reference points. They argued that spending time 
with a person who is in poor health could lead to an increase in self-assessed health 
because people may take the poor health of the care recipient as reference point, 
even though the objective health level of the caregiver could have decreased. 
 A clear conclusion regarding the longer-term effects of informal caregiving 
cannot yet be drawn. As all studies used survey data, many were unable to estimate 
longer-term caregiving effects. Only five studies estimated effects over a longer time 
period. Both Schmitz and Westphal (2015) and De Zwart et al. (2017) did not find any 
longer-term effects of informal caregiving on health. Schmitz and Westphal con-
cluded that there might not be large scarring effects of care provision; De Zwart and 
colleagues mentioned that selective attrition may have biased their results. The other 
three studies estimating longer-term effects found mixed results, showing both pos-
itive and negative effects of informal care. Kenny et al. (2014) found negative health 
effects two years after the start of caregiving for working female caregivers and posi-
tive effects for non-working caregiving males. Rosso et al. (2015) grouped all persons 
who provide informal care at baseline and found that after six years low-frequency 
caregivers have greater grip strength (representing physical health) than non-caregiv-
ers. The study by Coe and Van Houtven (2009) is the only one that compared persons 
who stopped providing care to persons who continued caregiving for two more years. 
They found negative mental health effects for females and negative physical health 
effects for males who continue caregiving.
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4. Conclusion
Due to population ageing, most OECD countries have to deal with a growing demand 
for LTC. As often both formal and informal care can meet this demand, the key is to 
find the right balance between the two types of care. This paper aimed to provide 
insight into this trade-off by summarizing both theoretical and empirical literature 
regarding the costs and benefits of formal and informal LTC.
 Our review provides two important insights. First, economic theory makes clear 
that not everyone is equally inclined to provide informal care. Both individual 
characteristics and the institutional context can shape a person’s caregiving decision. 
Particularly persons with a lower income or who are unemployed are more likely 
to provide informal care and may thus experience the negative consequences of 
caregiving. 
 Second, our literature review shows that there is ample evidence of a negative 
impact of caregiving on the health of the provider. This caregiving burden can 
manifest itself both in mental and physical health effects. Important to note is that 
these effects differ strongly per subgroup of caregivers. Especially female, and married 
caregivers, and those providing intensive care appear to incur negative health effects 
from caregiving. This could be the result of having other responsibilities on top of 
caregiving duties, or, especially for women, because of a pressure that is felt to 
provide care. Such pressure may make it difficult to quit caregiving tasks when they 
become too burdensome (Pinquart & Sörensen, 2003).
 As individuals may not be able to fully insure themselves against the conse-
quences of caregiving, there is a need for government intervention to take away the 
necessity to provide care or to compensate the caregiver. Public provision of LTC or 
private insurance subsidies could solve this problem, but they may drive up costs by 
crowding out too much of the informal care supply. The extent to which crowding out 
is a problem depends on the strength of the prevailing social norms and altruistic 
preferences in society. 
 While this study does not (and did not intend to) offer a conclusive answer 
regarding the optimal mix of formal and informal care, the paper does highlight 
the complex trade-off that policymakers face. Formal and informal care each have 
their own costs and benefits. Subsidizing formal care can be costly but might relieve 
individuals from the caregiver burden, while stimulating informal care might have 
the opposite effect. Policies affecting either of the two types of care should therefore 
always consider their impact on the other form of LTC. 
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 To further improve our understanding of the trade-off between the two types of 
LTC, we propose the following additional research. First, further research is needed 
about the different impacts of informal care on various subgroups of caregivers, as 
current studies do not provide conclusive insight into these differences. Knowing 
which groups are most strongly affected by informal care and understanding the 
drivers behind these effects may help policymakers decide how to reduce the negative 
effects of informal care and to facilitate a better targeting of support for informal 
caregivers. Second, research is needed into the long-term effects of providing infor-
mal care, given that most empirical studies have only measured short-term effects. 
Third, more research is needed to disentangle the family and the caregiving effect, 
since the caregiving effect might be overstated in most empirical studies as the family 
effect was not accounted for. Fourth, it would be worthwhile to gain enhanced insight 
into the impact of the various types of caregiving and their intensity. Next, given the 
potentially important role of the institutional context on the caregiving decision, 
more research on the health effects of informal care in the Dutch LTC system is imper-
ative, since the number of empirical studies of this specific context is very limited. 
 Finally, this overview of current literature also raises important questions about 
the trade-off between formal and informal care in a larger context. Societal trends 
such as increasing female labor force participation and delayed retirement ages 
could affect the caregiving decision as well. Due to longer and increasing labor force 
participation, individuals may become less inclined to provide informal care, thus 
necessitating more formal care. However, when the provision of informal care mainly 
stems from a feeling of obligation (because of social norms or altruistic preferences), 
individuals would continue their caregiving duties, thereby facing a double burden 
of work and informal care. It would be interesting to explore these trends in future 
research.
Relevance for the Netherlands
Insights from this paper are relevant for the Dutch context. Dutch public long-term 
care expenditures are among the highest in the OECD and are expected to grow 
substantially in the coming decades (OECD, 2017; Eggink, Ras & Woittiez, 2017). Aside 
from the increase in long-term care expenditures, we also observe a growing number 
of Dutch informal caregivers. Between 2012 and 2016 the number of caregivers in the 
Netherlands grew by 20%, and currently more than 3 million adults are estimated to 
provide informal care (Gezondheidsmonitor, 2012, 2016). This surge in the supply of 
informal care could be driven by population ageing but may also be the result of the 
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policy changes related to the Social Support Act, which aim to stimulate reliance on 
social networks instead of governmental support (WMO, 2015). 
 An important empirical question is whether the burden of caregiving is equally 
shared among the Dutch population or whether it is primarily carried by specific sub-
groups with lower income and labor productivity, as predicted by economic theory. 
Data from the Health Monitors of 2012 and 2016, weighted to represent the entire 
Dutch population, show that some groups indeed provide care more often than others 
(see Table 1 in textbox 2). In 2016, almost 19% of people with a full-time job (more 
than 32 working hours a week) provide care compared to just over 26% of employees 
who work no more than 12 hours a week. Elderly persons also more often provide 
care than full-time employees, as about one fourth of retirees provide informal 
care. Although we see an increase in the propensity to provide care among nearly 
all identified subgroups, especially the participation of elderly rose sharply between 
2012 and 2016. In contrast to theory, individuals in higher income groups provide care 
more often than individuals in lower income quintiles. Various variables may have 
confounded this result; richer individuals, for example, are often older and hence 
more likely to care for a spouse or parent. In terms of care intensity, lower income 
households do provide more hours of informal care.
 The differences in the propensity to provide care between the various subgroups 
highlight the importance of considering the downsides of informal caregiving. After 
all, policies to stimulate informal care might only reach that part of the population 
that is already inclined to provide care. As a result, the costs of care affect only a 
specific part of the population.
 In light of the growing number of caregivers, an important question is how to 
minimize the caregiving burden. Under the Social Support Act (2015), Dutch munic-
ipalities are obliged to provide support to informal caregivers. Examples of such 
interventions for caregivers are respite care and support groups. Respite care offers 
caregivers a short break by temporarily providing formal care to the person in need. 
Support groups offer advice and enable the sharing of experiences with other care-
givers. However, many municipalities find it difficult to target informal caregivers who 
need this support (VNG, 2016). As shown from our literature review, not all caregivers 
are similarly affected by their tasks, and hence not all require this type of support. 
Female and married caregivers, and those providing intensive care turn out to 
experience larger negative consequences of informal caregiving. Policymakers might 
therefore especially target interventions to those individuals who need these most.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 – Embase search strategy 
Facets Search terms
Informal caregiving (((‘caregiver’/de OR ‘caregiver burden’/de OR ‘caregiver support’/de) AND 
(‘family’/de OR ‘nuclear family’/exp)) OR (caregiv* OR care-giv* OR ((carer OR 
carer* OR caring) NEAR/6 (spous* OR husband* OR wife OR wives OR 
daughter* OR son OR sons OR informal* OR family OR relative OR 
relatives))):ab,ti) 
AND
Health impact (‘health impact assessment’/exp OR ‘psychological aspect’/de OR 
‘depression’/de OR ‘mental stress’/de OR ‘psychological distress assessment’/
exp OR (((mental OR psychological* OR physical OR health) NEAR/6 (impact* 
OR effect OR affect* OR implication* OR status* OR aspect* OR profile* OR 
outcome*)) OR depressi* OR ((stress OR distress OR strain) NEAR/3 (carer OR 
caregiver*))):ab,ti)
AND
Elderly or older 
family member
(‘aged’/exp OR ‘geriatrics’/exp OR (aging OR ageing OR elderl* OR ((aged OR 
older) NEAR/3 (population OR relatives OR person*)) OR geriatric* OR geronto* 
OR spous* OR parent*):ab,ti)
AND
Study design (instrumental variable analysis/de OR ‘regression discontinuity design’/exp 
OR (‘propensity score’ OR match* OR ‘simultaneous equation’ OR 
‘simultaneous equations’ OR ((instrument*) NEAR/3 (variable)) OR Difference-
in-differences OR ‘Difference in differences’ OR D-in-D OR ((Regression) 
NEAR/3 (discontinuity OR kink OR fuzzy OR sharp OR DD)) OR ‘selection model’ 
OR ‘Heckman model’):ab,ti)
NOT
Document type ([Conference Abstract]/lim OR [Letter]/lim OR [Note]/lim OR [Editorial]/lim)
AND
Language [english]/lim
Appendix 2 – Inclusion and exclusion criteria – Phase 1 (title/abstract screening) and 
Phase 2 (full-text screening)
PIOS
Population Focus informal 
care
Does the article focus on informal caregiving? Yes – Include
No – Exclude
Independent 
variable
Focus informal 
care for adult/
elderly
Is this article about informal caregiving to an 
adult/elderly person (as compared to providing 
informal care by or to a child)?
Yes – Include
No – Exclude
Outcome Health impact Does the article estimate the health impact of 
informal caregiving?
Yes – Include
No – Exclude
Study design Study design Does the article use any of the defined meth-
odologies in order to estimate a causal effect?
Phase 1: In case of matching – exclude when 
the article does not match on health of the 
caregiver (include in case matching 
procedure is unclear based on title/abstract)
Phase 2: In case of matching – exclude when 
the article does not match on health of the 
caregiver
Yes – Include
No – Exclude
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Appendix 3 – Methodological details of included studies
Authors Data 
source
Sample represen-
tativeness
Data type Sample size Study design Matching or IV strategy Methodological 
quality
Family effect
Brenna and 
Di Novi 
(2016)
SHARE, 
2004-2007
(2 waves)
Representative 
for the non- 
institutionalized 
population aged 
50 and older
Longitudinal Matched treated/
Control
1,138/3,292
PSM Matching on: demographics; family 
composition; socio-economic vari-
ables; information on parents receiv-
ing care; self-reported probability of 
receiving an inheritance; mental 
health status and caregiver status at 
the first wave.
Matching quality:
matched on care-
giver status and 
mental health in 
first wave 
Not 
 specifically 
considered
Coe and 
Van Hout-
ven (2009)
HRS, 
1992-2004
(7 waves)
Nationally 
 representative for 
community-based 
population
Longitudinal Sample contin-
ued caregiv-
ing=2,557
Sample initial 
caregiving=8,007
Simultane-
ous-equation 
models (2SLS, 
Arellano-Bond)
IV continued caregiving: Death of 
mother 
IV initial caregiving: Number of boys/
girls in the household
Strength of 
instrument:
F-statistics: 
16-837 (continued 
caregiving)
6-18 (initial 
 caregiving)
Not 
 specifically 
 considered
Di Novi et 
al. (2015)
SHARE, 
2004 & 
2006/2007
Representative 
for the non- 
institutionalized 
population aged 
50 and older
Longitudinal Matched treat-
ment/control
535/1,825
PSM Matching on: socio-economic vari-
ables; employment; family composi-
tion; occupation and income; previ-
ous SAH, CASP and caregiving status
Matching quality:
Matched on care-
giving status, SAH 
and CASP in first 
wave
Not 
 specifically 
considered 
Do et al. 
(2015)
Korean 
LSA, 2006-
2010
(3 waves)
Nationally 
 representative 
study of non- 
institutionalized 
adults aged 45 
years or older
Longitudinal n=2,528 
(daughters-in-
law) n=4,108 
(daughters)
Simultaneous-
equation 
models
(2SLS, 
IV-probit)
IV: ADL limitations of the mother 
(-in-law) and of the father(-in-law)
Strength of 
instrument:
F-statistics: 86 
(daughter-in-
law) and 37 
(daughter)
Aim to avoid 
family effect 
by focusing 
on physical 
health and 
care for par-
ents-in-law
Fukahori et 
al. (2015)
Japanese 
panel 
survey on 
middle-
aged
persons, 
1997-2005
Randomly 
selected from the 
national popula-
tion
Longitudinal Matched treated/
control
155/155 (males)
188/188 (spouses)
PSM Matching on: employment, SAH, 
retirement, age, education and wage
Matching quality:
Not matched on 
pretreatment 
status.
Not 
specifically 
considered
Goren et al. 
(2016)
Japan 
National 
Health and
Wellness 
Surveys,
2012-2013
Stratified by sex 
and age to ensure 
representative-
ness of adult 
population
Cross-sec-
tional
Matched treat-
ment/control
1297/1297
PSM Matching on: sex, age, BMI, exercise, 
alcohol, smoking, marital status, CCI 
(Charlson comorbidity index), insured 
status, education, employment, 
income, and children in household
Matching quality:
Not matched on 
pretreatment sta-
tus.
Not 
specifically 
considered
Heger 
(2016)
SHARE, 
2004-2013 
(4 waves)
Representative for 
the non-
institutionalized 
population aged 
50 and older
Longitudinal n=3,669 (female)
n= 2,752 (male)
Simultaneous-
equation 
models
IV: Indicator of whether one parent is 
alive 
Strength of 
instrument:
F-statistics: 18-47
Estimate 
family effect 
by adding 
health of 
parent as 
variable to 
model
Hernandez 
and Bigatti 
(2010)
HEPESE,
2000/2001
Representative-
ness not 
 discussed in 
 article
Longitudinal 
(one wave 
used)
Matched treat-
ment/control 
57/57
Direct matching Matched on: age, gender, socio-
economic status, self-reported health, 
and level of acculturation
Matching quality:
Not matched on 
pretreatment 
 status.
Not 
specifically 
considered
Hong et al., 
(2016)
Korea 
Commu-
nity Health 
Survey 
2012-2013
Representative
of the entire 
community-
dwelling adult 
population
in South-Korea
Cross-
sectional
Matched treat-
ment/control
3,868/3,868
PSM Matched on: 
age, sex, education, household 
income, insurance type, current 
smoker, current drinker, and stress 
level.
Matching quality:
Not matched on 
pretreatment 
 status.
Not 
specifically 
considered
Kenny et al. 
(2014)
HILDA, 
2001-2008
Representative 
sample of private 
Australian house-
holds
Longitudinal Matched treat-
ment/control
424 / 424
PSM Matched on pre-treatment:
age, sex, marriage/partner, children, 
work hours, income, education, 
country of birth, chronic health con-
dition limiting work, partner with a 
chronic health condition, another 
household member with a chronic 
health condition, having at least one 
living parent and baseline year
Matching quality:
Matched on base-
line characteristics
(pre-treatment)
Not 
specifically 
considered
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Authors Data 
source
Sample represen-
tativeness
Data type Sample size Study design Matching or IV strategy Methodological 
quality
Family effect
Rosso et al. 
(2015)
Woman’s 
Health 
Initiative
Clinical 
Trial
(1993-
1998)
Representative-
ness of sample 
not mentioned. 
Participants were 
recruited at clini-
cal centers across 
the US from 1993 
to 1998 to partici-
pate in clinical 
trials
Longitudinal Matched treat-
ment/control
2,138/3,511
PSM Matching on: socio-demographic 
variables & health (smoking, chronic 
illnesses, obesity status)
Matching quality:
Matching on 
baseline charac-
teristics (not 
pre-treatment)
Not 
specifically 
considered 
Schmitz 
and West-
phal (2015)
GSOEP, 
2002-2010
Representative 
longitudinal sur-
vey of households 
and persons living 
in Germany
Longitudinal Matched treat-
ment/control
1,235/29,942 
 
PSM Matched on: age of mother/father; 
mother/father alive; (age) partner; 
number of sisters; personality traits; 
socio-economic variables; health sta-
tus 
Matching quality:
Matching on 
health before 
treatment
Sample stratified 
by care provision 
at t=-1
Not 
specifically 
considered
Stroka 
(2014)
Techniker 
Kranken-
kasser
(2007-
2009)
Administrative 
data from largest 
statutory sickness 
fund in Germany
Longitudinal Matched treat-
ment/control
5,696/3,125,140 
(males)
7,495/2,085,946 
(females)
PSM + D-in-D Matched on:
socio-economic variables; employ-
ment; education; work position; 
health status
Matching quality:
Matched 
pre-treatment, at 
baseline only 
non-carers
Not 
specifically 
considered
Trivedi et 
al. (2014)
BRFSS
(2009/2010)
Nationally repre-
sentative survey 
in the United
States
Cross-sec-
tional
Matched treat-
ment/control
110,514/110,514
PSM Matched on:
socio-economic variables; household 
situation; employment, income, vet-
eran status, immunizations within
the previous year, exercise, tobacco 
use, self-identified
physical disability, obesity status; 
healthcare access;
and survey characteristics
Matching quality:
Not matched on 
pretreatment sta-
tus.
Not 
specifically 
considered
De Zwart
et al. (2017)
SHARE, 
2004, 
2006, 
2010, 2013
Representative for 
the non-institu-
tionalized popu-
lation aged 50 
and older
Longitudinal Matched treat-
ment/control
404/10,293
PSM Matched on:
socio-economic variables; household 
situation; wealth; health status; 
health and age of spouse
Matching quality:
Matched on pre-
treatment covari-
ates + sample 
stratified by care 
provision at t=-1
Not 
specifically 
considered. 
Abbreviations: SHARE: Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement Europe; HRS: Health & Retirement Study; 
HEPESE: Hispanic Established Populations for the Epidemiologic Study of the Elderly; HILDA: Household, 
Income & Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey; GSOEP: German Socio-Economic Panel; BRFSS: Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System; PSM: propensity score matching, 2SLS: two-stage least square; D-in-D: difference-
in-difference, IV: instrumental variable
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